Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, the European Parliament has the power to veto most international agreements negotiated by the European Union. The European Parliament rarely uses its veto power, but its mere existence gives it significant leverage. Indeed, the Parliament can influence negotiations through various activities, such as adopting resolutions. These activities have weight because a parliamentary veto could always potentially occur.

But how does the Parliament actually use these tools? When does it get involved in negotiations, and how intensively? Marine Bardou sets out to answer these questions by conducting a systematic review of all 344 international agreements subject to parliamentary consent between 2009 and April 2023. She examines four parliamentary activities: resolutions, plenary debates, parliamentary questions and the production of expertise reports.

Bardou explains that previous studies have looked at the Parliament’s role in negotiations for a handful of high-profile agreements. However, these studies give no clear picture of how the Parliament typically behaves across all negotiations. In particular, it is unclear during which stages the Parliament is active: during the first stage which consists in preparing negotiations, the second which includes negotiations per se or the third stage, which involves ratification? Her research aims to change that.

Bardou’s research reveals six types of parliamentary involvement. The first and most common type is the Bystander, accounting for 57.6% of agreements. For these agreements, the Parliament doesn’t conduct any activities at all. It simply votes on whether to give consent at the end of the process.

Bardou notes that this finding was quite surprising. For most agreements, the Parliament does not leverage its veto power through activities. This challenges the idea that the Parliament has become a major player in EU foreign policy across the board.

The second most common type is the Loud Late Riser, occurring in 18% of agreements. In these cases, the Parliament only becomes active during the ratification stage – after negotiations are complete. Its activities focus on communication, such as holding debates or asking questions, rather than trying to influence the agreement’s content.

Bardou explains that this type of involvement allows the Parliament to raise awareness about agreements and potentially build public support. However, it comes too late to substantially change the deal.

The third type is the Halfway Incomer, seen in 9% of agreements. Here, the Parliament gets involved during negotiations and remains active through ratification. It often uses a mix of activities, including more substantive ones, such as adopting resolutions to outline its priorities.

The fourth type, the Quiet Early Bird, occurs in 8.4% of agreements. In this pattern, the Parliament is active early in the process – during the authorization stage when the EU decides to open negotiations, and/or during the negotiation stage itself. However, it conducts relatively few activities overall.

Bardou finds the Quiet Early Bird interesting because it shows the Parliament trying to shape agreements from the start. However, it does so in a low-key way, perhaps to maintain good relations with other EU institutions.

The fifth type is the Maximalist Contributor, seen in 4% of agreements. This rare type involves the Parliament being highly active throughout the entire process, from authorization through ratification. It uses a wide range of activities with high frequency.

Bardou notes that the Maximalist Contributor pattern is what many people imagine when they think of a powerful Parliament. However, it only happens for a small minority of agreements.

The final and rarest type is the Intermittent Contributor, occurring in 2.6% of agreements. In this unusual pattern, the Parliament is active during the authorization and ratification stages, but not during negotiations themselves.

Bardou’s research reveals some surprising findings. First, the Parliament is far less active overall than many might expect. For nearly 60% of agreements, it doesn’t conduct any activities beyond the final consent vote. Second, when the Parliament does get involved, it’s most often late in the process. This limits its ability to shape the actual content of agreements.

Bardou explains that these findings add nuance to the idea that the Lisbon Treaty dramatically increased the Parliament’s role in EU foreign policy. While it has more powers and leverage now, it doesn’t always use them intensively.

However, Bardou is quick to point out that this doesn’t mean that the Parliament is irrelevant. Even when it is not conducting the activities she studies, the possibility of a veto likely influences how other EU institutions approach negotiations and interact with the Parliament.

The research also reveals interesting patterns across different policy areas. For example, the Parliament tends to be more active on trade agreements and those related to EU neighbourhood policy. However, there’s no clear-cut relationship between policy areas and types of involvement. Bardou explains that the diversity of involvement patterns is striking. Even within a single policy area, the Parliament can be a Bystander for one agreement and a Maximalist Contributor for another.

This diversity raises an important question: why does the Parliament get involved differently in different negotiations? Bardou suggests several factors that might play a role. The salience of the agreement may be important, with the Parliament more likely to get heavily involved in high-profile agreements that attract public attention. Resources could also be a factor, as the Parliament has limited staff and time and must prioritize which agreements to focus on. The complexity of the agreement might matter, as some may be too technically complex for the Parliament to engage with effectively. Finally, Bardou notes that her study only looks at formal, public activities, and there may be informal discussions happening behind the scenes.

Bardou’s research provides a valuable benchmark for understanding parliamentary involvement in foreign policy, not just in the EU, but potentially in other political systems as well. It offers a way to systematically compare how different parliaments engage with international negotiations.

Looking ahead, Bardou sees several important avenues for future research. She suggests that we need to dig deeper into why the Parliament chooses different involvement patterns for different agreements. Additionally, we should explore how these patterns affect the legitimacy and democratic accountability of EU foreign policy.

Bardou’s research offers a nuanced view of the European Parliament’s role in shaping international agreements. While the Parliament has the ability to get actively involved beyond saying yes or no, it does so selectively and often late in the negotiation process. This work provides a foundation for further explorations into how parliaments can effectively engage in foreign policy-making in complex political systems.